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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AT SEA*

At the present time there are three possible remedies
available to seamen who are injured in the course of their
employment. 1 In order to maintain any of these actions, the
injured party must of course qualify as a seaman. The
traditional tests used to determine whether a maritime
worker is a seaman are as follows: 1) the vessel must be
in navigation, 2) the worker must have a more or less
permanent connection with the vessel, and 3) the worker must
be aboard the vessel primarily to aid in navigation. 2 These
standards 3have been somewhat modified by Offshore Company v.
Robinson.
In that case, the court stated that there is an
*

See Headnotes

1. Only injuries at sea will be covered by this paper.
State workmen's compensation acts have been excluded because
normally under such acts injuries must occur within the
territory of the state and generally on land. Nor will this
paper be concerned with the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Act. The Longshoremen's Act expressly provides that
the injury must be received upon the navigable waters,
including any drydock, of the United States and also provides
that the Act does not apply to those injuries where state
workmen's compensation can be validly applied. 33 U.S.C.
§§901-05 (1964). But with the Calbeck case in 1962, the
Supreme Court held that in the gray area called the "maritime
but local" or "twilight zone" (navigable waters within the
state), jurisidiction may overlap so that the employee has
the right to elect the remedy he desires choosing between the
applicable state workmen's compensation and the federal
Longshoremen's Act. Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S.
114 (1962). Finally, in 1953 Congress extended coverage of
the Longshoremen's Act to include the outer continental shelf.
33 U.S.C. § 903 (1964); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act,
43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-43 (1964). It applies to injuries to
maritime workers received seawards from the historical boundaries
of the adjacent states, which means it applies only to
injuries sustained more than three geographical miles offshore.
Generally, actions brought under these acts will be seeking
recovery for injuries occurring within the territorial limits
of the United States.
2. Kolius & Vickery, Maritime Employee's Remedies Against
Employers, 23 ARK. L. REV. 192, 198 (1969-70).
3. Offshore Company v. Robinson, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959).
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evidentiary basis for holding a person to be a seaman
if: 1) there is evidence that the worker was assigned
permanently to a vessel, or performed a substantial part of
his work aboard a vessel, and 2) his duties contributed to
the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its
mission. Therefore, it seems that it does not matter whether
the vessel is actually in navigation or if the maritime
worker is aboard primarily in aid of navigation so long as
he performs a substantial part of his work on the vessel.
Futhermore, the definition of "vessel" has been extended to
cover almost any floating object that is capable of being
moved from one place to another.4
The first and by far the oldest remedy is maintenance
and cure. A seaman who suffers injury or illness "in the
service of his ship" is entitled to maintenance and cure at
the expense of the owner. This recovery includes unearned
wages for the duration of the voyage (according to some
authorities, for the duration of the seaman's contract of
employment), medical expenses actually incurred or likely
to be incurred in the treatment of the seaman, and living
allowance until maximum recovery has been achieved. 5 The
injury does not have to be causally related to the seaman's
shipboard duties. It is generally held to be sufficient
that the seaman suffered the injury or illness during 6his
employment period, without his deliberate misconduct.
Neither is the right dependent on any fault or negligence of
the shipowner. 7
Historically, the courts have espoused a very liberal
attitude in their interpretations of such seamen's compensation
actions and continue to do so. This liberal judicial policy
is exemplified by the holding in Calman Steamship Corp. v.
Taylor.
Courts have referred to seamen over the years as

4. Kolius & Vickery, 23 ARK. L. REV. 192,200 (1969-70).
5. GILMORE & BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY, 262-71 (1957)
(hereinafter cited as GILMORE & BLACK).
6. Id., at 257.
7. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 168-70 (1903).
8. Calman Steamship Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 528 (1938).
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ward of admiralty; as such they must be protected. Consequently,
the requirement "in the service of the ship" has been
interpreted to include leaving the ship for shore leave
(fell into a ditch near the dock) and returning to the ship
9
(struck by motor vehicle on roadway leading to ship),
injury of seaman while on leave1 0 and injury while at a
location where entertainment was sought. 1 1 This right of
seamen to maintenance and cure is virtually automatic and
is forfeited only by conduct "whose wrongful quality all
recognize--insubordination, disobedience to orders, and gross
misconduct..12 The action may be brought in admiralty in
federal or state courts or in common law in federal courts,
where the $10,000 jurisdictional requirement and diversity
13
of citizenship must exist.
The shipowner's warranty of seaworthiness of the vessel
is a remedy separate from, and not limited by, recovery under
maintenance and cure. This concept is non-statutory and was
only recently developed by American courts in the Osceola case. 1 4
Essentially, this doctrine is based on the liabilitycreating promise by the shipowner to the seaman that the ship
and its gear are reasonably fit for the voyage in question
and that the personnel aboard ship are equal in seamanship
and disposition to ordinary seafaring men. 1 5 It is a concept
of liability without fault insofar as negligence plays no
part in the doctrine. It is unlimited by conditions contained
in the seaman's contract of employment and unlimited by the
traditional concepts of negligence, such as contributory
negligence, fault, and proximate cause. 1 6 However,
contributory negligence o1 7 the part of the seaman will
work to mitigate damages.
9. Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724 (1943).
10. Koistinen v. American Export Lines, 194 Misc. 942,
83 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1948).
11. Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523 (1951).
12. Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511, 516 (1949).
13. BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY § 612, at 201 (6th ed. 1940);
NORRIS THE LAW OF SEAMEN, § 555 (1970).
14. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
15. Keen v. Overseas Tankship Corp., 194 F.2d 515 (1952).
16. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
17. Baer, At Sea with the U. S. Supreme Court, 38 N.C.L.
REV. 307, 316 (1960); Kolius & Vickery, 23 ARK. L. REV. 192,
209

(69-70).
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One of the most important pronouncements developing
these standards was the Mahnich case, 18 which held that the
seaworthiness doctrine would henceforth include "operating
negligence," with the result that the seaman would no longer
lose his remedy against the owner even though negligence was
shown to be the proximate cause of the injury. In that
case, theship's officer had provided defective rope to the
seaman. Additional examples of cases extending the doctrine's
coverage include Peterson (injury caused by block brought
aboard by stevedore), ± 9 Boudoin (vessel held to be unseaworthy
because injury caused by aggressive, violent and dangerous
crewmember),2 0 Gutierrez (warranty extended to include defective
cargo containers), 2 1 and June T (vessel held to be unseaworthy
because the size of the crew was insufficient for proper
operation.) 2 2 One exception to the warranty is "transitory
unseaworthiness," as introduced in Cookingham (seaman slipped
on Jell-O spilled on ship's stairway; held to be foreign
substance and not part of ship's gear). 2 3 Procedurally,
such causes of action generally are in admiralty and can
only be heard in federal court by a judge without jury unless
jointly pleaded with a Jones Act cause of action.
Until 1920, the seaman had no remedy against a shipowner
for negligence. With the passage of the Jones Act, the
injured seaman was provided with a remedy in a civil action
at law with a jury trial, based on the negligence of 24the
employer, or of someone for whom he was responsible.
In effect, the Jones Act gives seamen the same rights that
injured railroad employees have under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act. 2 5 First of all, the injured seaman must
make an election to maintain a Jones Act suit or an action
for unseaworthiness in addition to his claim for maintenance
and cure, but, according to most authorities he is not
18. Mahnich v. Southern Steamship Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
19. Peterson v. Alaska Steamship Co., 205 F.2d 478 (9th
Cir. 1953), aff'd per curiam 347 U.S. 396 (1954).
20. Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955).
21. Gutierrez v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963).
22. June T, Inc. v. King 290 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1961).
23. cookingham v. United States, 184 F.2d 213 (1950).
24. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
25. F.E.L.A., 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1964).
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entitled to have cumulative damage recoveries under both
the Jones Act and the warranty of seaworthiness. 2 6 The
Peterson case 2 7 holds that these two remedies are alternative.
28
However, the later McAllister case" holds that the words
"at his election" mean "in addition to" and result in merely
adding another remedy to those the seaman had before the
Jones Act. 2 9 Gilmore says that the seaman may plead both
claims in the same action and the jury may consider both
claims. But if he wants to plead both Jones Act and
seaworthiness doctrine causes of action, he must do so in
a single proceeding. 3 0 Any favorable jury verdict will be
31
upheld on appeal if supportable under either claim.
Plaintiff must elect whether to sue "in admiralty" without
a jury, or "in law" in a state or federal court with or
without a jury. Under a joint action, the jury may consider
the unseaworthiness issue.
The two conditions precedent to a seamen's compensation
action--in the course of employment and injury--are rather
easily shown. "In the course of employment" is given a
broad interpretation by the courts similar to that of "in
service of his ship" under maintenance and cure. Leaving
the ship after being discharged has been held to fall within
the course of employment. 3 2 Injury is shown just as in any
other action.
Under the Jones Act, the concept of negligence has
approached that of strict liability. 3 3 The plaintiff must
establish only the traditional elements of a negligence
action--duty, breach of duty, causation, and damage. The
shipowner's duty is easily demonstrated since his duty is

26. GILMORE & BLACK, at 288.
27. Pacific Steamship Co., v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130 (1928).
28. McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958).
29. Norris, sec. 678 (1970).
30. Note 31 supra, McAllister; 38 N.C.L. Rev. 307, 319
(1960).
31. GILMORE & BLACK, at 289.
32. Braen v. Pfeifer Oil Transportation Co., 361 U.S. 129,
132 (1957).
33.

Smith, A Case for a Seagoing Workmen's Compensation

Act, 3 VAND. INT'L. 99, 109 (1970).
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statutory and automatically applies to seamen working in the
course of their employment. It has been repeatedly made
clear that seamen are wards of admiralty, and that the
owner's duty is a duty of "fostering protection."13 4 Breach
is also liberally interpreted. Frequently, it is defined by
courts as the "negligent failure to provide a safe place
to work or a seaworthy ship. Even the slightest negligence
35
of the part of the employer has been held sufficient.
Included within the breach are all negligent acts (both
misfeasance and nonfeasance) by masters, officers or fellow
crewmen. 36 Into the causation element, a concept like res
ipsa locuitur has been introduced. In the Johnson case=
it was described as a rule granting seamen a "permissible
inference from unexplained events." in addition, the
requirenent of negligence may be satisfied if it is shown that
the seaman's injuries were casually related to the violation
of a navigation statute. 3 8 Damages are shown as in any
negligence suit and may include compensation for pain and
suffering, wages lost, medical expenses and care and impairment
of future earning capacity. 3 9 As is true with the warranty
of seaworthiness, contributory negligence of the employee
only mitigates damages proortionately. 4 0 As evidenced by
one recent Jones Act case,
there seems to be a trend
developing to allow punitive damages for wilful and wanton
misconduct toward the crew which the owner has ratified.
It is questionable whether the present system is
satisfactory to all parties concerned. At least one writer
thinks not and has made the following criticisms of the
34. Cortes v. Baltimore insular Lines, Inc., 287 U.S. 367
(1932).
35. Ferguson v. Moore-MaCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521
(1956).
36. GILMORE & BLACK, at 312.
37. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 46 (1948).
38. Kerman v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426 (1957)1
38 N.C.L. REV. 307, 322 (1960).
39. NORRIS, S 697, at 417 (1970).
40. Aman v. American Export Lines, Inc., 326 F.2d. 955
(2d Cir. 1964).
41. Patition of Dan Noroke Amerikalinge A/S, 276 Fed.
Supp. 163 (1967).

present system in support of a single comprehensive
workmen's compensation act for seamen: seamen are unsatisfactorily protected because under existing remedies the
shipowner may be able to limit his liability;4 2 seamen
are under pressure not to file claims or to testify in
behalf .of fellow employees and, as a result, ill will and
poor employment relations are encouraged; and expensive,
time-consuming and complex litigation is usually necessary to
recover. 4 3 On the other hand, the shipowner, when unable
to limit his liability, is subject to extremely high tort
damages under both the Jones Act and the warranty of
seaworthiness. Recoveries are unpredictable. The various
courts differ considerably in their interpretations and
holdings. These criticisms present a strong argument for
legislative change and suggest that an adoption of a seaman's
workmen's compensation act should certainly be considered.

42.
43.

46 U.S.C. §§ 181-95 (1964).
Smith, 3 VAND. INT'L. 99 (1970).
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